The right to fish in perpetuity has far-reaching implications. It means that an ITQ becomes an asset, which appreciates in value when that species is well-managed, and loses value if a species is over-fished. An ITQ owner can therefore benefit from this asset in several ways:

• through the use of improved year-round fishing practices to reduce bycatch and increase efficiencies as the QMS ensures a stable catch level in well managed fisheries;
• by investing in ways to increase the value of the catch through improvements in harvesting, processing and marketing;
• through active involvement in improving the management of the fisheries to ensure sustainability.

The right to freely transfer quota is also important, since it allows participants to enter or to exit the fishery and to make adjustments to their business operations. This can act to reduce over-capitalisation, as owners of quota who are not making a profit can sell their quota and exit. Companies can also rationalise their quota holdings to match their fleet requirements or respond to changes in bycatch mixes. If large catches of a particular species are caught, a company can acquire ACE from another company for that year to ensure that those fish are not wasted and that penalties for overfishing are not imposed. A company no longer needs extra vessels since quota is not attached to a particular vessel, and can therefore become more economically efficient (thus further reducing over-capacity).

Finally the payment by quota owners of annual levies to cover the costs of research and management has encouraged industry to better understand what research is required to assess sustainable catch levels and to become actively involved in the scientific and management processes that underpin their investments in commercial fishing.

In many countries, when overfishing is evident, and the Government imposes a TACC cut, industry receives subsidies from Government, or the Government pays to buy vessels in order to reduce over-capacity. Under this system, the incentives on industry are to lobby Government to increase the quota because that is the only way to increase their profits.

However, this is not the case under the QMS, where both industry and Government have the same direct incentives to maintain the stocks at or above MSY levels, where the long-term economic benefits are greatest. Industry members in New Zealand have requested decreases in TACCs and closures of fisheries where they have been concerned about the status of the stocks, or because excessive fishing pressure would result in reduced economic returns. Anywhere else in the world these kind of arguments from industry would be unthinkable.